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Abstract
Background: After relaxing social distancing measures, South Korea experienced a resurgent second epidemic
wave of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). In this study, we aimed to identify the transmission dynamics of
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections and assess the impact of COVID-19 case
finding and contact tracing in each epidemic wave.
Methods: We collected data on COVID-19 cases published by local public health authorities in South Korea and
divided the study into two epidemic periods (19 January–19 April 2020 for the first epidemic wave and 20 April–11
August 2020 for the second epidemic wave). To identify changes in the transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2, the daily
effective reproductive number (Rt) was estimated using the illness onset of the cases. Furthermore, to identify the
characteristics of each epidemic wave, frequencies of cluster types were measured, and age-specific transmission
probability matrices and serial intervals were estimated. The proportion of asymptomatic cases and cases with
unknown sources of infection were also estimated to assess the changes of infections identified as cases in each
wave.
Results: In early May 2020, within 2-weeks of a relaxation in strict social distancing measures, Rt increased rapidly
from 0.2 to 1.8 within a week and was around 1 until early July 2020. In both epidemic waves, the most frequent
cluster types were religious-related activities and transmissions among the same age were more common.
Furthermore, children were rarely infectors or infectees, and the mean serial intervals were similar (~ 3 days) in both
waves. The proportion of asymptomatic cases at presentation increased from 22% (in the first wave) to 27% (in the
second wave), while the cases with unknown sources of infection were similar in both waves (22 and 24%,
respectively).
Conclusions: Our study shows that relaxing social distancing measures was associated with increased SARS-CoV-2
transmission despite rigorous case findings in South Korea. Along with social distancing measures, the enhanced
contact tracing including asymptomatic cases could be an efficient approach to control further epidemic waves.
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Background
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is an infectious
disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome cor-
onavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection [1]. It was first re-
ported in December 2019 in Wuhan, China [2], and the
World Health Organization declared it a public health
emergency of international concern on 30 January 2020
[3]. South Korea became the third country to report an
imported COVID-19 case on 19 January 2020 [4]. Fur-
ther spread of COVID-19 in the community was re-
ported in mid-February, and the Korean Ministry of
Health and Welfare declared the highest level of public
health alert on 23 February 2020 [5]. Since the first
COVID-19 case was identified in South Korea, isolation
of confirmed cases, contact tracing, extensive testing,
and timely quarantine of all contacts have been con-
ducted under the strategic guidelines for COVID-19
control from Korea Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (KCDC) [6, 7]. Furthermore, combined public
health measures including travel-related measures, case-
based measures, and community measures were imple-
mented across South Korea which helped control the
first epidemic wave without a complete lockdown (Table
S1) [5, 8]. Between 22 March and 19 April 2020, strict
social distancing measures included recommendations to
the public to stay at home and to delay or cancel social
gatherings, as well as policies including closing schools
and other public facilities, allowing greater flexibility in
sick leave, and encouraging work-from-home and flex-
ible working hours [9, 10]. These strict social distancing
measures were relaxed on 20 April 2020, because the
daily reported number of cases was under 50 and the
unknown origin of infection was less than 5% among
total cases of investigation for the previous 2 weeks [11].
Sustained increases in cases were observed as the
strict social distancing measures were further relaxed
by opening public facilities on 6 May 2020 when the
first epidemic wave had already ended. Increase of
the cases can be observed by the changes of public
health efforts of extensive COVID-19 case finding
and contact tracing [12]. However, there is a lack of
study to assess the changes of this active case find-
ing strategy specifically.
To characterize the transmission dynamics of SARS-
CoV-2 in South Korea, we identified the major cluster
types of COVID-19 cases, and we estimated the time-
varying effective reproductive number, serial interval dis-
tribution, age-specific infector-infectee matrices for the
two COVID-19 epidemic waves. Furthermore, to assess
public health efforts to find and trace cases in South
Korea, we estimated the proportion of cases that were
asymptomatic and the proportion of local cases with an




South Korea is comprised of a special city, seven metro-
politan cities and nine provinces, with a total population
of 51.4 million. Among the 14,700 confirmed COVID-19
cases in South Korea to date (16 August 2020), 8358
(57%) cases were reported from the Daegu-
Gyeongsanbuk region (5.1 million population), including
5564 cases from a large initial cluster linked to a reli-
gious community [13, 14].
We collected data on COVID-19 cases that had been
confirmed by real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase
chain reaction (RT-PCR) in South Korea. Nasal swab
samples from all suspected contacts of COVID-19 con-
firmed cases were tested at the KCDC or national desig-
nated laboratories, following a consistent test protocol
[15]. Data in the early COVID-19 epidemics from the
Daegu-Gyeongsanbuk region have not been made pub-
licly available [16].
Local public health authorities provided daily updates
of all laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 cases on their
webpage and we compiled daily updates from the public
dashboard in different local authorities. Information in-
cluded national and local case number, age, sex, symp-
toms, symptom onset date, source, exposure date, and
location (within or outside South Korea) of infection
were provided. We also compiled a database of COVID-
19 infector-infectee transmission pairs where precise
symptom onset dates and source of infection were avail-
able. Here, we focused on the period from 19 January
through 11 August 2020, after which the specific infor-
mation of cases was not yet released by the local author-
ities under the reinforced regulation of privacy
protection [17].
Definitions
Based on the epidemic curve and the timing of relax-
ation of social distancing measures, we defined the first
epidemic wave of COVID-19 as the period between 19
January 2020–19 April 2020, and the second epidemic
wave between 20 April – 11 August 2020. Furthermore,
we defined community clusters as five or more linked
COVID-19 cases [18], excluding cases with epidemio-
logic links to the secondary transmission and within
household transmissions [18, 19]. The types of clusters
included musical events, religious activities, leisure activ-
ities, nosocomial infections, residential homes for the
elderly, shopping malls, workplaces, academic-related,
and restaurants [19]. The workplace includes logistic fa-
cilities, call centres, insurance companies, military facil-
ities, banks, governmental offices, and sales offices in
this study. We used the officially agreed cluster settings,
and we matched the cases in the cluster reported in each
region using the national number of cases. Unlinked
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local cases were those in which the source of infection
has not been found. For the transmission pairs, we de-
fined the infector as the primary COVID-19 case, which
was identified from the source of infection from the
case, and infectee is the secondary case from the
infector.
Statistical analysis
We compared the differences in age groups between two
different waves using chi-squared tests. We described
the epidemiological characteristics of COVID-19 cases
and the epidemic curve was constructed by stratifying
the data into local and imported cases. To identify the
potential changes in SARS-CoV-2 transmissibility of
local cases after relaxing social distancing measures, we
estimated the time-varying effective reproductive num-
ber (Rt), which defines the mean number of secondary
infectious cases generated from a typical primary infec-
tious case at time t [20]. We also included local clus-
tered cases to estimate Rt. We estimated Rt using the
EpiEstim package in R [20, 21]. The critical threshold of
Rt is 1, where the epidemic becomes under control if Rt
falls below this threshold sustainably. Rt was estimated
based on the respective serial interval distributions, esti-
mated from the data for the first and second epidemic
waves in this study and the daily incidence of COVID-19
cases over time with a 7-day smoothing window [22].
We presented daily Rt after 1 February 2020, because a
stable estimate of Rt was not available due to the low
number of cases. We computed the serial interval, which
represents the time between a symptom onset of succes-
sive cases in a transmission chain, as the number of days
between infector and that of infectee in the transmission
pairs. We estimated the serial interval distribution dur-
ing the first and second epidemic waves by fitting a nor-
mal distribution [5, 22, 23]. We also presented the
number of clusters by categories and the frequencies for
respective age-groups of infector and infectee using age-
specific infector-infectee matrices in both epidemic
waves. Furthermore, to identify the changes of compre-
hensive COVID-19 case finding and contact tracing, the
proportions of asymptomatic cases at presentation and
cases with an unknown origin of infection among the
local cases were calculated, with 95% confidence inter-
vals estimated by the exact binomial method [24]. Ana-
lyses were done in R version 3.6.1 (R Foundation for
Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria).
Results
As of 11 August 2020, 5002 confirmed cases (2038 and
2964 cases in the first and second wave, respectively), in-
cluding 1189 imported cases (547 and 642 cases in the
first and second wave), have been reported outside of
Daegu-Gyeongsanbuk region in South Korea. There
were no statistically significant differences in age groups
between the cases from the two epidemic waves (p-
value = 0.22; Table S2).
Transmission dynamic of SARS-CoV-2 in South Korea
Figure 1 shows the epidemic curve with the event time-
line and the corresponding daily estimates of Rt between
19 January and 11 August 2020. In early February, after
the implementation of combined public health measures,
Rt gradually decreased to below the critical threshold of
1 March. After strict social distancing measures were
implemented on 22 March, Rt further reduced to below
0.2 in April. On 8 May, 3 days after the strict social dis-
tancing measures were further relaxed on 6 May, Rt in-
creased above 1 and eventually reached 1.8 on 10 May.
Rt fell to 1 in late May and fluctuated around 1 until
early July.
We identified 65 clusters, including religious activities
(n = 24, 36.9% of total clusters), workplaces (17, 26.1%),
institutional homes for the elderly (7, 10.7%), and a
number of other settings (Fig. 2 and Fig. S2). The overall
number of cases in these clusters was 1212 and the me-
dian number of cases in a cluster was 44 (maximum
190). Religious activities were the most frequently re-
ported cluster type in both waves and the number of
workplace clusters was largely increased from 6 (first
wave) to 30 (second wave).
We identified 707 transmission pairs, including 345 in
the first wave and 362 in the second wave. We excluded
4 pairs in the first wave and 5 pairs in the second wave
which had large negative serial intervals (<− 10 days)
[25]. In the first epidemic wave, the mean and standard
deviation of serial intervals were estimated to be 4.0 days
(95% credible interval, CrI: 3.7, 4.3) and 5.3 days (95%
CrI: 5.1, 5.5), respectively (Fig. 3A). In the second epi-
demic wave, the mean and standard deviation were 3.2
days (95% CrI: 3.0, 3.5) and 4.5 days (95% CrI: 4.3, 4.6),
respectively (Fig. 3B). Around 90% of transmission took
place among the age-groups of 20–80 years with ~ 30%
intra age-group transmissions in both waves (Fig. 4; Ta-
bles S3, S4). Compared to the first wave, transmissions
among the 40–59 age groups were less prominent in the
second wave and the oldest age group (≥80 years) were
much less affected. On the other hand, transmission in
the second wave increased for the infectees of age-
groups 30–39 and 60–69 by 7 and 18%, respectively.
Assessment of active case finding
Overall, 634 cases (16.6% of all local cases) reported no
symptoms at the time of the first clinical assessment. The
mean proportion of asymptomatic cases at presentation in
those aged 20–39 years increased from 14.7 to 21.8% over
time, and the overall mean proportion increased from 21.7
to 27.1% (Fig. 5A; Table S5). There were a total of 758
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unlinked cases in the study period. The overall mean pro-
portion of unlinked cases was similar across the two
epidemic waves (22.0 and 22.5%) (Fig. 5B; Table S6).
Discussion
In South Korea, the combined public health measures
implemented early in the COVID-19 epidemic reduced
the spread of SARS-CoV-2 [5]. As mobility restriction
has led to a substantial economic and social loss [26],
many countries including South Korea relaxed social
distancing measures after the first epidemic wave despite
concerns of a resurgence of COVID-19 cases. Our ana-
lysis of two different epidemic waves provided insight
into the strategies to control COVID-19, particularly in
countries that have relaxed their social distancing
measures.
A large number of imported cases in the first epidemic
wave challenged efforts to control COVID-19 in South
Korea. In late March 2020, many Koreans in Europe and
the United States traveled back to Korea due to the
Fig. 1 Incidence of COVID-19 and transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 in South Korea. A The reported number of confirmed COVID-19 cases by symptom
onset date outside of the Daegu-Gyeongsangbuk region in South Korea. The dates of first clinical assessment were used for cases who were
asymptomatic at presentation. There were key events against the spread of SARS-CoV-2 including a general election (on 15 April 2020), relaxing strict
social distancing measures (from 20 April 2020) and relaxing the social distancing measure further (from 6 May 2020), distribution of COVID-19 relief
funds to the general public (from 11 May 2020) and resuming school (from 20 May 2020). B Estimated daily Rt of SARS-CoV-2 in blue line with 95%
credible interval in light grey shaded area. The red horizontal dashed line indicates the critical threshold of Rt = 1. The vertical grey dashed line divided
the study period on first epidemic waves (19 January–19 April 2020) and second epidemic waves (20 April–11 August 2020). Notes: COVID-19 =
coronavirus disease 2019, SARS-CoV-2 = severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, Rt = effective reproductive number
Fig. 2 Types of clusters in South Korea in the first and second epidemic waves. Temporal distribution of the clusters of COVID-19 cases outside of
the Daegu-Gyeongsangbuk region in South Korea. The vertical grey dashed line divided the study period on first epidemic wave (19 January–19
April 2020) and second epidemic wave (20 April–11 August 2020)
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lockdowns. Public health authorities implemented
mandatory laboratory screening at the port of entry and
a 14-day mandatory self-quarantine program for travel-
lers from Europe (22 March) and then all overseas trav-
ellers (1 April) [27]. Local health authorities identified
547 imported cases and they were linked with 44 local
cases during the first wave (Fig. S1). Furthermore, there
were 642 imported cases linked with 3 local cases (most
from Asia and North America) identified during the
second wave. To encourage the 14-day mandatory self-
quarantine for travellers arriving in South Korea, the
Korean government implemented strategies to support
(by providing financial aid), monitor (by using mobile
phone application), and sanction (by enhancing non-
compliance penalty and subjecting to deportation) the
individuals in self-quarantine [27]. Therefore, the control
of transmission from imported cases improved substan-
tially in the second wave and the re-emergence was
mainly driven by local transmission in the community.
We identified many clusters associated with religious
activities where individuals spend prolonged periods of
time in close proximity [14]. These were the most fre-
quent type of clusters reported in both first and second
waves. Although the Korean government emphasized
wearing face masks and keeping physical distance be-
tween persons during their meeting, transmission still
occurred, possibly through the droplet-borne route or
environmental contamination of shared surfaces [28].
Resuming economic activities and school early in the
second wave (COVID-19 relief funds started distribution
to the public on 11 May and resuming school on 20
May) was likely associated with clustered outbreaks in
workplace, shopping malls, and academic institutions,
and this has likely contributed to the longer duration of
Rt around 1 more than a month.
Fig. 3 Serial interval distribution of SARS-CoV-2 in the first and
second epidemic waves in South Korea. The estimated serial interval
distribution was analysed by using the 708 infector-infectee pairs.
The vertical bars indicate the empirical probability density of serial
interval calculated by constructing transmission pairs from illness
onset of confirmed cases and black lines indicate fitted normal
distribution (accounting for the possible negative serial intervals/pre-
symptomatic transmissions and symmetric pattern of empirical
density). Infector who reported symptoms onset in the first
epidemic wave (19 January–19 April 2020; 345 pairs) (A), and second
pandemic wave (20 April–11 August 2020; 363 pairs) (B). The left of
vertical dashed line in grey indicates definite pre-symptomatic
transmission
Fig. 4 Age-specific transmission matrix in South Korea A Infector-infectee matrix for the first epidemic wave (19 January–19 April 2020). The
colour in each cell represents the probability of infector-infectee pairs of the respective ages. B Infector-infectee matrix for the second epidemic
wave (20 April–11 August 2020)
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We found that a large proportion of transmission oc-
curred between individuals of the same age, and trans-
mission between children was rare. However, school
closure in the first wave may have contributed to
reduced opportunities for transmissibility between
children [29]. After resuming school, the active
daily-screening, monitoring, and following personal
protective measures to the students may also reduce
the risk of transmission between children in the
second wave.
We identified that 16.6% of the local cases were
asymptomatic at the time of presentation, which is simi-
lar to those in Shenzhen (20%) and Hong Kong (21%) in
China [30, 31]. The proportion of asymptomatic cases
was lower in the first epidemic wave, particularly among
those aged 20–39 years. This is likely because the case
investigations were mainly symptom-based and required
an epidemiological link in the earlier period. The emer-
ging scientific evidence on the full spectrum of SARS-
CoV-2 infections encouraged more testing on asymp-
tomatic individuals. Young adults may have lower or de-
layed healthcare-seeking [32], which may explain their
lowest proportion of asymptomatic cases among all age
groups. In the second epidemic wave, extensive contact
tracing and screening for the large workplace and
leisure-related clusters, probably allowed the detection
of infected young adults who were still asymptomatic or
pre-symptomatic. This suggests that active case finding
and improving the awareness of the disease dynamics
among young adults is crucial to reducing asymptomatic
and pre-symptomatic transmission of SARS-CoV-2. The
proportion of asymptomatic cases among 80s increased
significantly from the first to second epidemic wave.
This was likely affected due to rapid and massive screen-
ing of the elderly for SARS-CoV-2 in residential homes
during the second epidemic waves.
In South Korea, all close contacts of laboratory-
confirmed cases were quarantined, and public health au-
thorities diligently traced the source of infection. The
presence of unidentified cases indicates hidden and un-
controlled transmission in the community. Therefore, a
low proportion of unlinked local cases is an indication of
effective case finding [33]. In our study, 20% of local
cases were identified as unlinked, which was lower than
the early phase of the epidemic (39%, 18 January – 2
March 2020) [34], similar to that in Singapore (17%)
[33], but lower than that in Hong Kong (36%) [35]. The
proportions of unlinked local cases were low in the two
epidemic waves and this indicates that extensive investi-
gation was maintained in both waves.
A study in China demonstrated that serial interval dis-
tributions can be shortened by active case finding and
enhanced public health measures [22]. In our study, the
mean serial interval was about 3 days, shorter than those
reported in China (4 days) [23], and a pooled estimate of
5 days [36]. The implementation of rigorous public
health measures, including registered mandatory digital
applications (QR codes) in public places for contact tra-
cing may contribute to earlier interrupt of the transmis-
sion of SARS-CoV-2. A negative number of serial
intervals indicates the symptom onset in the infectee oc-
curs prior to symptom onset in the infector. Based on
the previous literature on the serial interval of COVID-
19 [25], large negative serial intervals in some of trans-
mission pairs in our study should be interpreted with
caution as there could be uncertainty of the direction of
Fig. 5 The proportions of asymptomatic and unlinked local cases of COVID-19 in South Korea. A Age-specific proportions of COVID-19 cases who
were asymptomatic at the time of presentation in South Korea. B Age-specific proportion of infections of an unknown origin in South Korea. The
points were average proportions over the epidemic wave and the vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals estimated by the binomial
method. Notes: COVID-19 = coronavirus disease 2019
Ryu et al. BMC Infectious Diseases          (2021) 21:485 Page 6 of 9
transmission or the infectee could have been infected by
another unidentified infector.
A modelling study demonstrated that control mea-
sures, including contact tracing, testing, and self-
isolation, would be less effective if asymptomatic infec-
tions are higher [37]. Furthermore, a review study
showed that restricting mass gathering was associated
with a reduced incidence of COVID-19 [38]. Our find-
ings are consistent with these previous findings that con-
tinuous, strict social distancing measures and active
seeking asymptomatic cases are critical to reducing the
spread of SARS-CoV-2 in a community.
Recent studies in Hong Kong, China [39], and South
Korea [5] demonstrated that social distancing measures
were effective in controlling COVID-19. However, there
have been few studies on the control of resurgences in
transmission after the relaxation of social distancing
measures. A simulation study also demonstrated that the
second wave of infection would develop when contact
tracing failed [40]. Our findings of Rt indicated that even
when rigorous public health efforts were in place, relax-
ation of certain social distancing measures in the com-
munity, in our case further reopening of public facilities,
may allow resurgence of COVID-19 within days. Further
research on how social distancing and other public
health measures should be relaxed is warranted. Further-
more, simulation studies based on empirical data with
the counterfactual scenarios to predict a potential resur-
gence of COVID-19 would help public health authorities
prepare for future outbreaks.
Our analysis has several limitations. First, we excluded
the Daegu-Gyeongsanbuk region where the epidemic
was mainly driven by large superspreading events in a
religious group at the very beginning of the first epi-
demic wave. The outbreak occurred mainly in Daegu-
Gyeongsanbuk region and well before the major control
measures were implemented, and uncooperative attitude
of the members of the religious group was reported dur-
ing the epidemiological investigation [14]; hence it did
not reflect characteristics of typical community trans-
mission in South Korea. Furthermore, the Korean gov-
ernment designated the Daegu-Gyeongsanbuk region as
a special disaster zone and recommended travel with
caution during the study period [41]. Second, we have
not included data after mid-August 2020 which reported
a number of clusters from religious groups as publicly
available data were limited. Third, recall bias could affect
the description of symptom onset and the exposure
period of the infectee. Fourth, asymptomatic cases who
were not identified and the imperfect sensitivity of the
RT-PCR test may affect the estimated transmissibility in
our study. Fifth, local public health authorities may iden-
tify the infection source after publishing the case-
information, which may overestimate the proportion of
unlinked local cases. Sixth, due to data limitation, we
have not considered the spatial transmission heterogen-
eity along with the temporal variations in this study.
Lastly, the effects of seasonality on SARS-CoV-2 were
not considered which may partly explain the change in
transmissibility [42].
Our study has several strengths including the estima-
tion of daily Rt of SARS-CoV-2 in South Korea from ill-
ness onset data, whereas previous studies [6, 43, 44]
estimated it from the daily confirmed cases, which might
be subject to reporting bias [45]. Furthermore, we esti-
mated Rt using the serial interval distributions, which is
evaluated by constructing transmission pairs on this
illness onset data. Whereas, the earlier estimates were
based on the approximation of serial interval distribu-
tions, evaluated for different data and locations, mostly
used the early finding of serial interval in China which
did not even include the pre-symptomatic transmission
[46] and might have been different over time (here for
two epidemics) [22]. Third, we included all local clus-
tered cases to estimate Rt to better characterize the
changes of transmissibility after relaxing social distan-
cing measures which did not include earlier study [5]. Fi-
nally, our study has an added value over our previous
report [5], providing a more detailed interpretation of
the transmission dynamics by accounting for local clus-
tered cases [36], and included changes in transmissibility
after relaxing social distancing measures in South Korea.
Conclusions
South Korea has implemented public health measures to
reduce the transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2. However,
despite rigorous public health efforts, relaxing social dis-
tancing measures allowed the reemergence of COVID-
19 in South Korea. This study is the first epidemic ana-
lysis of the two different epidemic waves of COVID-19
using empirical data based on the illness onset and serial
interval which analysed in our transmission pairs. Our
findings suggest that enhanced contact tracing including
asymptomatic cases is an efficient approach to control
further epidemic waves together with social distancing.
A more conservative approach to control COVID-19
should be considered together with close monitoring of
social mobility.
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